OPEN AGENT HACKATHON 2026 · TRACK 03 · REASONING ARCHITECTURE

Sanctions Desk

A review desk for sanctions-screening alerts. The desk recommends; a person decides.

Prototype, audit-ready by design

Nemotron via Nightshift · Zetaris

Real OFAC and UN list entries; synthetic customers and payments.

Repo github.com/rahulmahadik/sanctions-desk

Site rahulmahadik.github.io/sanctions-desk



Nemotron alone said clear; the desk held the case for a person (ALR-0073).

Most alerts are noise; the costly mistake is closing the one that is real

Too many alerts. Name screening raises far more alerts than real matches; an analyst works each one by hand, field by field, and a senior reviewer approves any block.

The work is evidence work. The customer, the payment, the owners and the listed party come from several systems, and the one real match hides among the false positives.

EXTERNAL SOURCES · four of the README's five public cases · not results of this project

Barclays Bank Plc

2016 · OFAC

$2,485,890 settlement

Owners at 50 percent or more missing from the screening records

Payoneer Inc.

2021 · OFAC

$1,385,901.40 settlement

Close matches to listed names passed the filter

Mashreqbank

2021 · NYDFS

$100 million penalty

Fields left out of interbank payment messages, bypassing other banks' sanctions filters

MidFirst Bank

2022 · OFAC

Finding of Violation, in place of a civil monetary penalty

Existing customers re-screened only once a month

Source: README.md (The problem: public enforcement cases, from the official OFAC and NYDFS releases linked in the notes)

The desk recommends one of four outcomes; a person approves or overrides it, with a reason

Sanctions-screening analyst

analyst

A checked evidence pack and a recommendation for every alert; approves or overrides it towards more caution, always with a reason

Senior reviewer or sanctions officer

approver

Everything the analyst has, plus the second approval of a block and the right to override towards a less cautious outcome

Auditor or second line

viewer (read-only)

The sealed record of every review, the step-by-step replay and the signed receipt of every Nightshift answer; cannot decide


Outcome	What the desk recommends
CLOSE_FALSE_POSITIVE	Close the alert as a false positive
NEED_MORE_INFO	Hold the alert and ask for more information
ESCALATE_L2	Send the alert to a senior reviewer
RECOMMEND_BLOCK	Recommend a block to the sanctions officer

Who can approve it: close, hold or escalate: an analyst or an approver, with a reason. A block: two different people; the second must be an approver. It stays a recommendation: the desk blocks nothing.

Source: README.md (Who it is for; What the desk does for each alert); docs/GOVERNANCE.md (People, roles and the decision step)

A reasoning architecture, not a prompt: eleven logged steps, and every failure ends with a person

Code does most steps; the models weigh evidence. Amber paths end with a person, never a close.



Source: README.md (How it works); docs/ARCHITECTURE.md (The steps; Failure handling); docs/diagrams/1-architecture.mmd, redrawn for this deck

Live review of ALR-0073, 25 Oct 2026: every answer kept has a signed receipt; the backup's round 1 was sent back

Safety guard

Lightning, laptop

0.5 s · flagged

signature valid, key pinned

Screener

Lightning, laptop

2.0 s · flagged

signature valid, key pinned

Decision

Ultra, cloud

41.0 s · round 2

signature valid, key pinned

Critic

Ultra, cloud

27.9 s · approved

signature valid, key pinned

Risk signal from the payment reference

“Machine parts, onward delivery to Tehran”

sanctioned jurisdiction link · 90% · blocks a close

Recommendation: Escalate to level 2 · record sealed · waiting for a person to decide

Round 1 of the decision and the critic fell to the Ollama backup after a failed Nightshift call and a fast-lane retry; the critic sent it back. Round 2 on Ultra stood, and the signal keeps the case open.

Source: live review of ALR-0073 on 25 Oct 2026 (its trace and receipt ids are in the speaker notes); a recorded run of the same alert is replayed at rahulmahadik.github.io/sanctions-desk/runs/alr-0073.html; receipt log at /receipts/

A failing Zetaris data-quality rule holds the case: ALR-0030 cannot be closed without a date of birth

A data-quality rule blocks a close: the customer has no date of birth on record, so the Zetaris rule dob_present_for_individuals fails, the policy guard blocks any close, and the case goes to a person as need more information.

Recorded run sys2b (23 Oct 2026), replayed on the site at runs/alr-0030

8 + 29

= 37 data-quality rules in the semantic layer: 8 custom rules plus 29 key rules Zetaris adds itself (14 primary, 15 foreign)

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rules re-implemented by the agents; they ask Zetaris which records fail

The policy guard treats a failing rule as a block on any close; it can only raise caution. In the same run the critic sent back a citation of a table that does not exist.

Source: site replay of the recorded run sys2b (runs/alr-0030); eval/zetaris-harness.json (data_quality); docs/ZETARIS.md (Data-quality rules)

It re-checks, argues and screens without being asked; a flag can stop a close, never cause one

Stale check

does an earlier decision still hold?

code + H-MEM

List change

re-screens after a list update

code + Markovian

Challenger


argues against a close

Ultra, cloud

Safety guard

flags text aimed at the reviewer

Lightning, local




Live run (ALR-0067, 25 Oct 2026): the screener flags a planted instruction in a customer note

Each fires on its own and can only make an outcome more cautious; none can close a case. The guard caught 27 of 28 injected texts on the fresh set, with 7 of 16 false alarms on harmless text.

Source: README.md (What it does without being asked); docs/RESPONSIBLE_AI.md (Guardrails); eval/nemotron-scorecard.json (guard); live run of ALR-0067

On the 70-case exam the full system wrongly closed 0 of 43 risk cases; Nemotron alone closed 3 and 6



Dot: the run's share. Line: 95% range (Wilson). One run each.

Nemotron alone is one model call per case through Nightshift, no agents: it clears 23 of 25 but closes risk. The rules have a home advantage here: the exam labels share their definitions.

0 of 35

blocks the labels do not support, full system (13 recommended); Nemotron alone 5 and 1 of 35

81 s

median per alert in the current system's run (p95 240 s)

Source: eval/nemotron-scorecard.json (exam_arms); eval/REPORT.md (a2); the per-case result files in the notes
One case (EX-043) was relabelled after the runs, because the 50% rule applies through the holding company. Under the original labels: full system 0 of 42, Nemotron alone with text 5 of 42, rules 0 of 42. See eval/REPORT.md.

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risk cases wrongly closed on the 70-case exam


0 of 43, 95% range 0–8%, one run of the current system

Nemotron alone closed 3 and 6 of 43 on the same cases.

When unsure, the desk hands the case to a person.

Source: eval/nemotron-scorecard.json (exam_arms); eval/results/2026-10-25T11-52-00-415Z-sys6-routed.json; eval/REPORT.md (a2)
One case (EX-043) was relabelled after the runs, because the 50% rule applies through the holding company. Under the original labels: full system 0 of 42, Nemotron alone with text 5 of 42, rules 0 of 42. See eval/REPORT.md.

On the blind held-out rounds it wrongly closed 4 of 48 risk cases; the deterministic rules closed 13 of 48



Blind rounds, frozen before each run, on the system of its time. Wrong closes 2, 0, 2, 0; each led to a fix. In v2 the screener failed, so nothing closed.

0 of 25


clears made on the held-out rounds; the rules made 8

10 of 12

cases with the same outcome in all 3 runs (held-out v4); Nemotron alone 4 of 12 without the free text, 5 of 12 with it

Source: README.md (held-out table; results box); eval/nemotron-scorecard.json (heldout_totals); eval/repeat-study.json (all_runs_agree)

Lightning reads the raw text on the laptop; Ultra reasons on structured facts in the cloud



Who answered each step: the signed receipts of the 28 recorded evaluation runs (19 backup answers, no receipt). The 32 exported runs add 2 current-system and 2 Nemotron-alone runs.

Model-choice study	Reasoning on Ultra (cloud)	Reasoning on Lightning (laptop)
Median s per case	110	385
Clears made	3 of 10	1 of 10
Risk cases wrongly closed	0 of 10	0 of 10
Ollama backup answers	6	32

Why two sizes: 20 cases, one live run per arm.

The router picks the model in the pinned lane: Ultra answered 90 of 99 decision calls in the current run.

Fully local mode (held-out v4, 3 runs): 0 of 18 wrongly closed, 0 of 316 calls to the cloud; 0 of 18 clears, 17 of 36 held for a person (no usable answer), 292 s median vs 35 s on Ultra.

Source: eval/receipt-stats.json (recorded runs); README.md (who_* facts); eval/nemotron-scorecard.json; eval/model-choice.json; eval/local-mode.json (study A3)

3,411 signed receipts, all verified against the pinned key; a changed byte is caught

```
$ npm run -s receipts:tamper-test
receipt from eval/runs/heldout-routed-
20261023T121140Z/receipts.jsonl.gz
original:            valid_pinned
copy, 1 byte changed: invalid (byte 4827 of the receipt's JSON)
committed file:      unchanged
PASS: the change was caught
$
```

npm run receipts:tamper-test, 25 Oct 2026: one byte changed in a copy of a committed receipt; the check fails, as it should

0

invalid, malformed or unpinned among the 3,411 receipts (npm run receipts:check)

19

Ollama backup answers in the 28 recorded runs: no receipt by design, labelled as such

3,411 = 2,532 + 879


Ed25519-signed Nightshift receipts naming the model that served each answer: 32 exported runs plus the small studies, all verified.

THE RECEIPT GATE

By design, the desk never uses a Nightshift answer without a valid signature from the pinned key: it retries, then holds the case. Local backup answers carry no receipt and are labelled 'Ollama backup, no receipt'.

Source: eval/receipts-check.json (npm run receipts:check); npm run receipts:tamper-test; eval/receipt-stats.json; README.md (receipt_gate, backup_recorded); receipt log at rahulmahadik.github.io/sanctions-desk/receipts/

Zetaris is the only data path: 0 of 73 agent files name a data source



0 of 73 agent files name a data source, so a source switch is a layer change. Column and row policies, PII classification, MCP and lineage: not exposed to us in this edition; covered another way (notes).

Eight roles (own user, own token)	Used by	Tables granted
evidence	evidence step, queue	all tables; identifiers masked
ownership	ownership step	beneficial_owner
critic	critic's fact re-read	9 tables, no identifier table
memory	memory step	disposition
document	document check	customer_identifier
rescreen	list-change check	disposition, list_entry, alert, payment
reviewer	people reviewing	all tables, in full
eval	evaluation runs	read-only

Source: eval/zetaris-harness.json; zetaris/step-roles-check.json; docs/ZETARIS.md (Roles; Features we covered another way in this edition)

Three Meterless engines, each in a recorded case; four design choices make the desk different

H-MEM

13 of 13 tests

EX-051 (ALR-0058): the earlier clearance recalled and marked stale after the entry's date of birth changed; not closed

World Model

8 of 8 tests

Ownership cascade on EX-043 (ALR-0043): the holding company is 60% listed-owned, so its 70% counts in full

Markovian

8 of 8 tests

Re-screens every earlier decision after a list change, in bounded batches; the synthetic update changes 6 entries

WHAT WAS UNIQUE

3,947

of 3,411 receipts verified against the pinned key; an unsigned Nightshift answer is never used

Raise-only

policy guard, in code: it can hold or escalate, never close; 6 of 6 first-answer closes stopped

147 of 147

changed facts caught: code re-reads every cited fact before the critic's model sees it

37 rules

data-quality holds come from the semantic layer; a failing rule blocks any close; 0 re-implemented

Source: README.md (Meterless engines; prove block; critic-value block); eval/runs/sys6 trace (EX-051 memory recall; EX-043 ownership); eval/critic-mutation.json; eval/receipts-check.json

From a prototype to a bank pilot: five steps, written down; a person decides at every one

1. **Live list feeds**
   today a fixed snapshot of public OFAC and UN entries
2. **Cover payments**
   no handling yet; the payment party and route are screened
3. **Real bank volumes**
   every run used tens of alerts, not a daily volume
4. **Faster local reasoning**
   measured safe, not yet practical (held-out v4, 3 runs)
5. **Single sign-on and entitlements**
   desk roles come from the bank's own access management

A prototype, audit-ready by design. A person decides every alert; the desk never blocks, writes to a source system or messages a customer. Two limits: 0 of 25 held-out clears made (the rules made 8), and small synthetic test sets, one run per variant.

Check it yourself

github.com/rahulmahadik/sanctions-desk

rahulmahadik.github.io/sanctions-desk

SAMPLE_MODE=true docker compose up --build

npm run prove · npm run evidence:verify

Evidence first; a person decides. Thank you: Zetaris, Meterless and NVIDIA.

Source: docs/KNOWN_ISSUES.md (Not yet in scope; Measurement limits; Next steps); docs/GOVERNANCE.md; eval/nemotron-scorecard.json (heldout_totals)